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Security in Cyber-Physical Systems: A Control Systems Perspective

Title: Security in Cyber-Physical Systems: A Control Systems Perspective

演讲人:Prof. Petros Voulgaris, UIUC, Fellow of IEEE

  • 浙江大学玉泉校区工控新楼105教室
  • 时间:2018年10月26日(星期五)下午3点

Abstract:

Cyber-physical systems (CPS) have become ubiquitous in engineering and have extended the range of aerospace applications to several new domains. Unmanned Arial Vehicles (UAV) are typical examples of CPS that can execute cooperative missions of increasing complexity without constant supervision of human operators e.g., military reconnaissance and strike operations, border patrol missions, forest fire detection, police surveillance, and recovery operations to name a few. Similarly, current and future space applications such as satellite swarms and distributed spacecraft systems, autonomous and aerospace robotic systems, depend critically on the synergy of cyberspace with the physical components.

Pertinent to CPS is the notion of security, which is of paramount importance in aerospace, power, transportation, manufacturing, etc. The concept of security to malicious attacks brings an important new dimension in the design CPS.  In this talk, we present some aspects of this problem related to control system security to attacks and provide some ways to enhance detection and awareness. More specifically, we elaborate on this issue from the control analysis, design and actual implementation point of view. We consider malicious attacks on actuators and sensors of a feedback system which can be modelled as additive, possibly unbounded, disturbances at the digital (cyber) part of the feedback loop. It is shown that the standard sampled data implementation can create additional vulnerabilities to stealthy attacks, and therefore, when security is at stake, it is of paramount importance to have methods to eliminate these vulnerabilities. By devising a multi-rate scheme we can guarantee that stealthy attacks are not possible.  Further, we can provide precise trade-offs on performance and safety cost. Finally, we touch upon other type of attacks and their connections to switching systems and linear programming.

Short Bio:

Professor Petros G. Voulgaris received the Diploma in Mechanical Engineering from the National Technical University, Athens, Greece, in 1986, and the S.M. and Ph.D. degrees in Aeronautics and Astronautics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1988 and 1991, respectively.  Since 1991, he has been with the Department of Aerospace Engineering, University of Illinois where he is currently a Professor (also appointments with the Coordinated Science Laboratory, and the department of Electrical and Computer Engineering.)  His research interests include optimal, robust and distributed control and estimation; networked control; applications of advanced control methods to engineering practice including, power systems, air-vehicle, nano-scale, robotic, and structural control systems.  Dr. Voulgaris is a recipient of several awards including the NSF Research Initiation Award, the ONR Young Investigator Award and the UIUC Xerox Award for research.  He has also been a Visiting ADGAS Chair Professor, Mechanical Engineering, Petroleum Institute, Abu Dhabi, UAE (2008-10).  His research has been supported by several agencies including NSF, ONR, AFOSR, NASA, and Boeing totalling more than $12 million of funded projects.  He is also a Fellow of IEEE.